but not because I disagree with any of the General’s criticism. Rather, it projects PROFOUND weakness if the Commander in Chief accepts such an unprecedented public rebuke from a commanding officer. General McChrystal is exceptionally well credentialed for the task he was hired to perform. If he believes he is being undermined by the political staff in the White House and he is not getting satisfactory support from his Commander in Chief that is endangering the lives of his men and the success of the mission, he should be prepared to offer his resignation, as I suspect he might be, and offer his criticism as a private citizen. However, if President Obama allows General McChrystal to retain his command, even if he were to insist that the General offer a very public and humiliating apology, it weakens the authority of the Office of the President because it appears to the world that any officer can pop his mouth off to the Commander in Chief with minimal repercussion and that the President is not firmly in command. That is even more dangerous not only for the success of our mission in Afghanistan, but for peace and stability throughout the world.
KABUL — Pakistani military intelligence not only funds and trains Taliban fighters in Afghanistan but is officially represented on the movement’s leadership council, giving it significant influence over operations, a report said.
The report, published by the London School of Economics, a leading British institution, on Sunday, said research strongly suggested support for the Taliban was the “official policy” of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI).
Although links between the ISI and Islamist militants have been widely suspected for a long time, the report’s findings, which it said were corroborated by two senior Western security officials, could raise more concerns in the West over Pakistan’s commitment to help end the war in Afghanistan.
The report also said Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari was reported to have visited senior Taliban prisoners in Pakistan earlier this year, where he is believed to have promised their release and help for militant operations, suggesting support for the Taliban “is approved at the highest level of Pakistan’s civilian government”.
The commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan there was “clear evidence” that Taliban fighters had trained in Iran.
“There is, however, clear evidence of Iranian activity — in some cases providing weaponry and training to the Taliban — that is inappropriate,” he said, adding that NATO forces were working to stop both the training and the weapons trafficking.
McChrystal pointed to “indications” that some Taliban fighters have had training in Iran, and that weapons and ammunition have come across Iran’s border with Afghanistan.
“The numbers are not operationally significant, they have not changed the fight, and I am not prepared to tell you that the government of Iran is executing that as a policy,” he said.
“But I am prepared to say that we watch it closely, and if something were to increase, it would be something that would concern me significantly,” he said.
Last month, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates accused Iran of “playing a double game” by nurturing relations with the Afghanistan government while supporting insurgents to undermine U.S. and NATO troops. Iran denies the allegation.
A man freed from Guantanamo more than two years ago after he claimed he only wanted to go home and help his family is now a senior commander running Taliban resistance to the U.S.-led offensive in southern Afghanistan, two senior Afghan intelligence officials say.
Abdul Qayyum is also seen as a leading candidate to be the next No. 2 in the Afghan Taliban hierarchy, said the officials, interviewed last week by The Associated Press.
Franklin Roosevelt was famous for being able to give people on all sides of a policy dispute the impression that he supported each person’s position. Such artfulness helped him manage domestic politics for 12 years in the presidency. Similarly, President Obama wrote in his book “The Audacity of Hope” that “I serve as a blank screen on which people of vastly different political stripes project their own views. As such, I am bound to disappoint some, if not all, of them.”
All politicians — indeed all people — permit such ambiguous perceptions of themselves from time to time. But for presidents, it is vital that such ambiguities support, not undermine, their policy objectives. And, as important articles in the Washington Post and the U.K. Guardian last weekend disclose, there is major confusion at the highest levels over what the president’s policy is in Afghanistan.

